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ABSTRACT

This study aims to understand whether the gender of mutual fund managers impacts investors’
capital allocation decisions to US mutual funds. This study uses net alpha as an indication of
proper capital allocation, as higher net alpha indicates not enough capital, and uses value added
(gross alpha multiplied by fund size) as an indication of skill, as higher value added indicates
higher skill given that capital is allocated properly (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). This
research utilized the Morningstar database to gather information on 5,000 US mutual funds to
compare net alpha and value added between male funds and female funds. The present research
found that female managers have statistically significantly higher net alpha and higher value
added, compared to male managers, likely indicating that females are not allocated enough
capital but have higher skill, as they are able to extract high value added even without proper
capital allocation.

Keywords: Gender, Mutual Fund, Skill, Capital Allocation
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INTRODUCTION

This study examines whether investors discriminate based on the gender of mutual fund
managers when they allocate capital to mutual funds, by exploring differences in performance
and skill among different groups of managers. The results of this study could help determine
whether female-led mutual funds are an untapped opportunity for investors.

Women are notoriously underrepresented in the financial sector, especially within mutual funds,
even though females have long ago reached educational parity with males (National Center for
Education Statistics 2013). It is important to understand (1) whether skill levels and fund
performances differ between the genders and (2) whether investors are biased toward a particular
gender because such information can shed light on the mutual fund industry’s practices and can
help investors make better choices about what types of funds and what types of managers they
should be investing with.

Under efficient markets, if males and females have, on average, the same skill levels (i.e.,
managerial skill levels do not differ on the basis of gender), then female-led funds and male-led
funds should be of equal size, on average (Pham 2015). This would mean they would show equal
value added (i.e., gross alpha multiplied by fund size). However, there is a deep imbalance
between the genders in the world of mutual funds – is this due to underlying factors that lead the
genders to be fundamentally differently skilled in mutual fund investing, or is this due to societal
norms and investor preferences toward male managers?
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This research utilized the Morningstar database to gather information on 5,000 US mutual funds,
and R software was used to run statistical analysis in order to determine whether there were any
statistically significant differences between male funds and female funds in terms of net alpha
and value added. Through this methodology, this research hoped to understand the gender
differences in fund management to give managers and investors the most accurate perspective
within the current climate of the mutual fund industry.

The results of this study indicate the funds labeled as female had statistically significantly higher
net alpha and statistically significantly higher value added when compared to funds labeled as
male. Therefore, this study concluded that investors might hold institutional bias against females
since females are not properly allocated capital, even though they show higher skill through
higher value added.

BACKGROUND THROUGH LITERATURE REVIEW

Economic Gender Inequality
Gender inequality remains pervasive in the business world—the World Economic Forum
estimates that it would take approximately another 80 years for women to achieve economic
parity with men (World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2016). This figure comes
as a shock to many, as economic parity remains far away even though women outpace men in
educational achievements (National Center for Education Statistics 2013). In many parts of the
world, men and women are at or near parity in health and education, but economic participation
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and economic opportunities lag behind by about 20%, even in the most gender-equal nations
(Tyson 2015).

Such gender inequality is an important issue to solve because the growth benefits of unlocking
the female workforce are significant: achieving gender parity in workforce participation rates
would increase the GDP of developed nations by 12% and by an even larger percentage in
developing markets (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Report 2015).

Gender Inequality in the Financial Sector
While this issue is prevalent across most parts of the international business world, women are
especially and notoriously underrepresented in the financial sector. Fewer women participate in
US fund management than do in heath care (37% of doctors are women), law (33% of lawyers
are women), and accounting (63% of accountants are female) (Lutton 2015). In general, the
financial sector seems to have a weaker professional pipeline for females, compared to other
careers that require similar education, and this could be rooted in systematic biases (i.e.,
discrimination) against females (Lutton 2015).

Half of the investment capital in the United States comes from women, but very few women are
involved in managing the invested capital (Chadick 2009). Looking at the finance industry, about
23% of investment bankers are female, which is a percentage that is among the highest in the
industry (Alden 2014). Only about 12% of senior leaders at real estate firms and approximately
11% of senior leaders at venture capital firms are women (Beltran 2016). These numbers
dwindle further in other parts of the financial sector, as only 10% of mutual fund managers are
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women, only 7% of buyout firm leaders are women, and only 3% of hedge fund managers are
women in the United States (Beltran 2016; Chadick 2009). Males exclusively managed 74% of
the finance industry’s assets, females exclusively manage 2% if the industry’s assets, and mixedgender management teams fill in the remaining portion (Lutton 2015).

Financial institutions and funds have come under much public scrutiny in recent years due to the
global economic crisis, and gender diversity could be tapped into as an important and impactful
factor in changing and rebuilding the financial system. With this, this research posits that women
represent a significant component of necessary talent to construct an effective, stable, and
growing economic model and to build a trustworthy and sustainable financial system through
new perspectives, diverse risk management styles, and high skill in asset management (Chadick
2009). As result, if systematic discrimination is present, it is important to consider and resolve.

Gender and Fund Manager Performance
Much research has been done to study gender differences in fund managers’ risk tolerance and
performance, due to the recently popularized idea that funds run by women tend to outperform
funds that are run by men. According to a report put out by Rothstein Kass (now KPMG) in
2013, funds managed by females showed an average return of 9.8%, while funds managed by
men showed a 6.13% return on the HFRX Global Hedge Fund index (Jones 2014). Similarly,
between January 2007 and June 2013, hedge funds managed by females exhibited an average
return of 6%, while the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index showed a loss of 1.1% and the
Standard & Poor’s 500 index returned 4.2% within that timespan (Jones 2014)
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However, such popular reports may not always be the most reliable in their research methods and
in considering key factors. It is important to note that funds managed by females tend to be much
smaller and more niche as compared to those run by men (Pham, 2015). Additionally, such
studies focused solely on hedge funds, which have only 3% women, and looked only at returns
without controlling for proper extraneous variables.

Gender and Financial Investment
After the popular studies of 2013 and 2014, researchers began to look into the question of gender
in fund management further. Risk and performance metrics that cover one-year, three-year, and
five-year horizons in U.S. mutual funds and hedge funds find that funds managed by women
outperform those managed by men (Luongo 2011). Such findings also indicate that funds
composed of an equal number of female and male managers are likely to lead to greater financial
market stability, as a result of a favorable combination of risk tolerance preferences and
investment strategies (Luongo 2011). Overall, it is striking that females remain significantly
underrepresented as fund managers, even though they show quality performance.

Unfortunately, such results are still questioned as other studies reveal that there is no gender
impact on financial investment performance. Stepping beyond the United States and exploring
the performance of 358 European diversified equity mutual funds, there were no statistically
significant difference in performance as explained by gender when funds were evaluated against
each funds’ designated market indices (Babalos 2015). However, males and females did exhibit
different investment style consistency and risk factor responses (Babalos 2015). Further, a study
of worldwide funds between 1994 and 2013 showed no difference in performance or risk
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between all-female and all-male funds when matched by fund size, fund category, and year of
observation (Aggarwal 2016)

Even though these results differ from the Luongo (2011) study in the United States, such
findings could have significant implications for fund managers and investors, as they set asset
allocation strategies and pick management teams. However, all of these studies focused on
returns as a measure of performance—Aggarwal (2016) essentially replicated the Rostein Kass
(2013) study but controlled for proper variables to isolate impact on returns. Unfortunately, the
aforementioned studies ignored the concept of fund manager skill due to their intense focus on
fund returns and did not go further to test whether there has been discrimination against female
fund managers by investors.

Theoretical Framework: Manager Skill Level vs. Manager Returns
The consideration of manager skill level is critical to evaluating mutual funds. The concept of
skilled fund managers has been a contested idea among researchers—there is much debate about
whether stock picking or market timing talent exists (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). However,
given that fund managers are compensated generously for their work, the lack of consensus on
the existence of skill is concerning (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). In theory, investors want to
place money with the most skilled managers (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015).

The question of assessing skill is complex. Some studies use net alpha (i.e., the average
abnormal return net of fees and expenses) to assess manager skill (Carhart 1997). However, if
the supply of skill is limited, then in equilibrium, net alpha is not determined by manager skill

8

and is instead determined by competition between investors, as higher skilled managers should
demand higher fees (Berk and Green 2004). With that, gross alpha (the average abnormal return
before fees are subtracted) may be a closer measure of managerial skill. However, gross alpha is
still just a measure of returns as opposed to directly being a measure of value (Berk and van
Binsbergen 2015).

Value is associated with the amount of money extracted from financial markets by each
manager, meaning that it must be a function of fund size. Therefore, in theory, holding fees
constant, gross alpha can only differentiate managers if all funds are the same size, which is not
the case, especially when comparing female funds and male funds (Berk and van Binsbergen
2015). After all, a manager with a smaller alpha but large fund might add more value than a
manager with a large alpha but small fund (e.g., 1% returns on $10 billion is large than 10%
returns on $1 million) (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015).

In a 2004 study, Berk and Green determined that there was no theoretical reason for gross alpha
to be related to manager skill, and in 2015, Berk and van Binsbergen argued that “the skill of a
mutual fund manager equals the value the fund extracts from markets” (i.e., the value added of
the fund), which is the fund's gross return over its benchmark multiplied by assets under
management. This measure of “value added” calculates the amount of money the fund obtains
from financial markets without evaluating how the fund decides to distribute the money (Berk
and van Binsbergen 2015). Thus, the measure is an indication of “the resulting product of all the
skills used to extract money from financial markets” (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015).

9

However, fees between managers may vary, so looking at fund size may not tell the whole story.
To analyze the theoretical framework to approach this problem, it’s important to hold certain
assumptions constant: (1) investors are rational, (2) financial markets are competitive, (3)
managers optimize, and (4) managers face decreasing returns to scale (Berk and van Binsbergen
2014). Thus, gross alpha generated by an active manager is αi = ai – biq with ai as the alpha on
the first cent that manager i actively invests, bi as a parameter that captures the decreasing returns
to scale of manager i, and q as the amount of money manager i has under active management
(Berk and van Binsbergen 2014).

Under these assumptions, Berk and van Binsbergen (2014) introduce the following propositions:
(1) net alpha does not measure managerial skill, (2) gross alpha only measures managerial skill if
all managers set their fees to ensure that all funds have the same AUM, and (3) value added (the
product of AUM and gross alpha) always measures skill.

Net alpha is not a measure of skill because under the assumption that investors are rational and
financial markets competitive, all mangers would have zero net alpha because non-zero net alpha
investment opportunities would be competed away. Additionally, since mangers optimize,
managerial skill follows the equation Vi = max [q(ai – biq)] with Vi as managerial skill, and the
optimal amount the manager decides to actively manage is q = ai / 2bi.

To illustrate these ideas, let’s assume that Manager A and Manager B are equally skilled, in that
they both have equal gross alpha when given equal amounts of money to invest. As each is given
more money to invest, gross alpha will decrease because investment ideas are limited so there are
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decreasing returns to scale. Let’s assume that gross alpha is 1% for both managers with $100M
assets under management (AUM), but gross alpha will decrease to 0% if an additional $100M is
invested. If Manager A charges a fee of 1% and has a fund with $100M AUM, Manager A’s
value added is $1M, and the total monetary fee collected by Manager A is $1M. As a result,
Manager A’s net alpha is zero—Manager A is in equilibrium and will not receive more money
from investors. Meanwhile, if Manager B charges a fee of .5% with the same skill as Manager A,
Manager B will be given more money under perfect competition because Manager B’s net alpha
will not be zero at $100M AUM. With the first $100M invested in Manager B, Manager B will
generate a value added of $1M but will only receive $500K in fees—Manager B’s net alpha is
.5%. As a result, Manager B may receive additional funds from investors in a perfectly
competitive market. With another $100M, Manager B’s overall gross alpha will become .5%
because (1) gross alpha was 1% for $100M out of the $200M AUM and (2) gross alpha was 0%
for the other $100M out of the $200M AUM. Note that there is no value added on the funds that
Manager B’s invested at 0% gross alpha. Manager B’s gross alpha becomes equal to the fees
charged as fund size increases, but value added stays the same.

Manager A and Manager B are equally skilled. In equilibrium, Manager A and Manager B have
different gross alphas and different fund sizes because their fee structures differ. However, both
investors have equal value added, illustrating their equal skill.

In terms of value added, it is important to note that skill cannot be defined exactly by fund size—
having a large fund does not inherently imply skill. Instead, it is those managers with the highest
skill that end up with the larger funds and reap the higher rewards (Lucas 1978). Managers need
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to prove themselves with high alpha to attract investors, and those managers with the highest
alphas should continue to receive more investments until the most skilled managers have large
funds in a space with much competition between highly skilled managers (Berk and van
Binsbergen 2015).

Overall, the concept of skill is important because investors appear to be able to detect manager
skill and use the information to invest their capital (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). Managerial
compensation is predominantly based on fund size, so investors effectively determine managerial
compensation as they allocate capital to funds (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). Thus, there is a
“very strong positive cross-sectional correlation between managerial skill and managerial
compensation,” suggesting that investors are able to deduce managerial skill, “as current
compensation better predicts future value added than past value added does” (Berk and van
Binsbergen 2015). However, if external factors besides pure managerial skill influence whom
investors give money to, then there is potential for the existence of an untapped pool of skilled
managers. In a perfect world, investors would give money to managers based on skill—
unfortunately, societal norms, industry pressures, and unconscious biases might sometimes keep
people from acting perfectly rationally, thus keeping investors from funding highly skilled
managers based on factors, such as gender, that are not merit-based (Dobbin 2011).

The graph of Vi = q(ai – biq) and αi = ai – biq has the potential to show systematic discrimination
– with the same αi line, two managers could have different Vi, showing that investors could be
discriminating in terms of capital allocation to different, yet equally skilled, managers. Please see
Figure 1.
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The optimal value added is the max of Vi indicated in Figure 1. According to the theoretical
framework laid out above, all managers that have their performance at αi = ai – biq (the blue line),
should have fund size Q* with maximum value added. However, if there are managers that lie
anywhere on the left side of the maximum point (e.g., one such point is indicated as sub-optimal
value added in Figure 1), those managers are not getting the optimal capital allocation for their
performance under efficient markets. Managers with fund size Q1 have higher current α but
lower value added.

Figure 1: Graph of Value Added and Alpha to Show Possible Discrimination
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If females are significantly exhibiting sub-optimal value added while males are exhibiting
optimal value added, there might be systematic discrimination in the market that impedes
females from receiving the proper capital allocation from investors. As a result, the distance
between average female fund size and average fund sizes can quantify the amount of
discrimination in the market, as shown in Figure 1.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The Present Study
All in all, it is clear that female participation in the business world is still limited, and women
continue to be largely underrepresented in the financial sector (especially in fund management).
Such underrepresentation could potentially lead to an untapped pool of skilled fund management
talent. After all, much work has been done to show the benefits of gender diversity in other
business areas (e.g., the benefits of female CEOs or of having female representation on corporate
boards), and recently, the idea of gender diversity benefits in fund management has become
popularized.

Unfortunately, much of the past research in this field has been questioned, as notable studies
show conflicting results, ignore the question of manager skill, and do not address investor
discrimination. It is further unclear if the phenomenon of higher female returns is restricted to the
United States, if findings are credible due to the limited number of female-run funds, and if
gender is the core driver of differences.
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This research aims to determine whether mutual fund manager gender impacts (1) proper capital
allocation to mutual fund managers and (2) manager skill in terms value added, as defined as
gross alpha multiplied by fund size (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). The objective of this paper
is to compare female value added to male value added and understand if women who are skilled
are likely to have smaller funds than men who are skilled because they are not afforded the same
amount of capital from institutional investors. Therefore, the present research hopes to discover
whether or not mutual fund manager skill level differs between the genders and whether or not
investor bias against females exists in the mutual fund industry.

This perspective is different from much of the past research in gender and mutual funds because
much of the literature is primarily concerned only with the return an investor can earn by
investing in a mutual fund. The Rothstein Kass (2013) study assessed skill by looking at fund
returns without controlling for or acknowledging fund size, while Aggarwal (2016) controlled
for fund size and acknowledged further extraneous factors but still solely assessed performance
as fund returns.

This research studies US-based mutual funds to see if there is evidence of skill differences
related to gender (as shown in previous literature) using the concept of value added, ensuring that
funds are assessed against a tradable benchmark and fund size is acknowledged as a function of
skill. Additionally, this research would like to understand whether gender is related to the
differing fund sizes between men and women (as opposed to the reason of skill) to further
explore investor biases against female managers and potentially unearth an untapped talent pool
of skilled managers.
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Target Audiences
The target audiences of this research are (1) investors (high net worth individuals, institutional
investors, etc.) who are looking to invest in mutual funds, (2) mutual fund managers who are
looking to expand their teams, and (3) college women considering post-graduation careers.

Investors want the highest returns possible from the best, most highly skilled managers. Investors
pick skilled managers and give them large sums to money to get large value added. However, if
investors have just been giving money to highly skilled men, then there might be a pool of highly
skilled female managers who are managing small funds and receiving returns that show high
skill. Such research could be a call to action for investors to place their money with female fund
managers, as these fund managers have the same skill as their male counterparts but have not
been given the proper amount of invested capital and compensation.

Additionally, given that females may be highly skilled at fund management, mutual fund
managers who are incentivized to have the highest performing funds or funds with the highest
value added would likely expand their talent search more deliberately.

Finally, women are a critical audience because women are extremely under-represented in
mutual funds. Very few women are involved in managing invested capital in the United States,
and the financial sector seems to have a weaker professional path for females, compared to other
careers that require similar education (Lutton 2015). As a result, understanding that women may
be vital assets to fund performance may lead to improvements in the professional pipeline and
give college women the confidence to pursue a career in fund management post-graduation.
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HYPOTHESES

The goal is this research is two-fold: (1) measure managerial skill level between genders in terms
of value added and (2) measure institutional differences between female funds and male funds to
understand investor decisions. As a result, the following null hypotheses are put into place.

H01 = Females are equally as skilled as males when it comes to fund management in
terms of potential value added

H02 = Investors do not have any institutional biases between males and females, implying
that when allocating capital investors assign the same amount of capital to male
candidates and female candidates who have the same skill and charge the same fees

This research hypothesizes that mutual funds managed by females will show higher returns than
men when looking across all US-based funds (Rothstein Kass 2013; Jones 2014; Luongo 2011).
However, with higher returns, this research hypothesizes that female funds will show lower
value added because female funds are smaller than male fund (Pham, 2015). As a result, females
might have higher net alphas as compared to men because they are not given enough investment
capital to drive down their net alpha, and females might have lower value added because they are
not given enough investment capital to extract larger value added or reach their optimal point of
value added. In this outcome, the skill difference between males and females may be
inconclusive, but it would be likely that investor discrimination may be the cause of not
receiving enough investment capital.
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METHODOLOGY

The present research aims to determine whether mutual fund manager gender impacts mutual
fund manager value added (skill) and understand investor decisions in terms of capital allocation.
In order to determine if there is a relationship between gender and manager skill, as well as if
there are fundamental differences between female and male funds determined by investor capital
allocation, this research employed statistical methodology on available mutual fund data across
time to compare (1) the net alpha and (2) the value added between female mutual funds and male
mutual funds.

Data was collected about (1) mutual fund manager gender from a variety of funds as well as
about (2) fund annual returns, (3) fund management fees, and (4) fund size (AUM). Data from
live, US-based mutual funds was acquired from the Morningstar database. The data covered a
span of time between 2006 an 2016. Morningstar also provided information on the 1 year, 3 year,
5 year, 10 year, and 15 year gross alphas that were pre-calculated, as well as fund management
fees, fund manager names, fund size, and fund annual returns for 5,000 mutual sub-funds. The
entire database contains over 20,000 mutual sub-funds, but only the first 5,000 funds could be
exported for analysis.

Data regarding mutual fund managers’ gender was derived from searching each fund manager’s
name (the names were given by Morningstar CISDM) on the fund website, Bloomberg, and/or
LinkedIn (Aggarwal 2016). Managers were determined as female if they were addressed as
“Ms.,” “Mrs.,” or “she.” Managers were determined as male if they were addressed as “Mr.,” or
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“he.” The fluidity of gender was not addressed in this study, as prior research has kept gender as
a binary variable and the data given did not require gender to be treated as non-binary.

The gross alpha used in this study was calculated based on the funds’ annual returns. While
Morningstar did give data regarding gross alphas for 1 year, 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, and 15
years timeframes, Morningstar’s method of calculation is unclear so the pre-calculated alphas
were viewed as unreliable. As a result, for this study, a separate gross alpha was calculated based
on the annual return data Morningstar provided. In order to calculate gross alpha, returns from
2006 to 2016 for each sub-fund were used. Plotting a regression of fund return minus the risk
free rate for each corresponding year as the y-axis and market return minus the risk free rate for
each corresponding year as the x-axis, gross alpha could be derived as the intercept of the
equation. With this method, a gross alpha for each fund was generated, across the time period of
2006 to 2016. However, some fund only included date for one or two years. In order to make
sure all data was fairly comparable, only funds with all years of returns between 2006 and 2016
were included in the statistical analysis, with all other funds excluded.

It is important to note that funds managed by females are often much smaller and more niche as
compared to those run by men (Pham, 2015). This research hopes to understand whether there is
a persistent differences in (1) net alpha (i.e., gross alpha minus management fee) between male
funds and female funds and (2) value added (i.e., gross alpha multiplied by fund size) between
male funds and female funds.
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Analysis Explanation
This research considers US-only funds. Within the data from Morningstar, many of the separated
funds were actually sub-funds of a larger firm. There were two possible routes for analysis: (1)
treat each sub-fund as its own fund and (2) completely collapse sub-funds that were under the
same firm name into one fund. In order to collapse sub-funds together, the weighted average,
weighted by fund size, was calculated of the management fees and the funds’ gross alphas. The
weighted average gross alpha was considered the new, larger fund’s gross alpha, and the
weighted average management fee was considered the new management fee. The new fund size
was the sum of the sub-funds’ fund sizes.

It is important to note that not all funds had information on the returns between 2006 and 2016,
so those funds were excluded from analysis. As a result, option 1 (using 5,000 sub-funds
separately) only yielded 780 usable data points due to a significant amount of excluded funds.
Option 2, unfortunately, did not yield enough data points for analysis.

It was critical to determine which funds would be considered female fund and which would be
considered male funds. Most funds in the dataset had multiple managers, and an insignificant
number included all or a majority of female mangers. Therefore, funds were labeled as female
funds if 10% of their fund managers were females—the statistical software only found a fair
balance of female funds and male funds when 10% female was considered female. Funds with
exclusively male managers were labeled as male.
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Once funds were classified as either a female fund and a male fund, two t-test were run using R
software: (1) average net alpha was compared between the male funds group and the female
funds group to determine whether capital was allocated fairly and (2) average value added (gross
alpha multiplied by fund size) was compared between the male fund group and the female fund
group to show whether possible skill differences exist or if investor discrimination based on
gender may be playing a role in sub-optimal value-added. Results were considered significant if
the p-value derived from the t-test was less than .05 (i.e., p < .05 means statistical significance).

If investors are allocating capital to the best investors, those investors should have net alphas that
are near zero and should have very high value added. However, if a specific group of managers
has a higher average net alpha, those managers are likely not receiving the proper funds they
deserve—one possible explanation for this would be discrimination. Thus, those managers who
are not receiving the proper funds might have lower value added due to their smaller fund size,
not due to real lower skill, because their value added is sub-optimal as they are prevented from
having larger funds—their value added might be higher (and could reach an optimal level) if
they were allocated more money by investors.

Scenario Analysis of Possible Results
There are nine possible scenarios of results. Please see Figure 2.

Net alpha illustrates if capital is being properly allocated to managers. If a group has a higher net
alpha compared to another group, that is a likely indication that investors are not allocating
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enough capital to the group with the higher net alpha—this indicates possible discrimination
against the group with higher net alpha.

Value added demonstrates skill. Higher value added often indicates higher skill, but given that
discrimination in terms of capital allocation might be at play, a certain group of managers may
be prevented from extracting their optimal value added since they are not given enough funds. If
capital is allocated properly, higher value added should indicate higher skill.

Figure 2: Explanation of the Nine Possible Result Scenarios
Note: “alpha” means net alpha. “VA” means value added.
alphaFemale > alphaMale

alphaFemale = alphaMale

alphaFemale < alphaMale

VAFemale > VAMale

Females are not given
enough capital but can
still extract high value
added, showing high skill
(Discrimination against
females)

Females and males are
both allocated capital
fairly, and females show
higher skill by extracting
higher value added

VAFemale = VAMale

Females are not given
enough capital, but males
and females show the
same skill (Possible
discrimination, as females
might be prevented from
extracting optimal value
added)
Females are not given
enough capital, but skill
is inconclusive (Possible
discrimination, as females
might be prevented from
extracting high value
added)

Females and males are
both allocated capital
fairly and show the same
skill level

Females are likely allocated
capital fairly, but skill is
inconclusive (Possible
reverse discrimination, as
males might be prevented
from extracting high value
added)
Females are likely allocated
capital fairly, and males
and females show the same
skill (Possible reverse
discrimination, as males
might be prevented from
extracting optimal value
added)
Females are likely allocated
capital fairly but do not
extract higher value added,
showing lower skill
(Reverse Discrimination, as
male are likely more skilled
but not given capital)

VAFemale < VAMale

Females and males are
both allocated capital
fairly, and females show
lower skill by extracting
lower value added
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RESULTS

Looking at all 5,000 sub-funds separately, without grouping under the firm level, net alpha was
statistically significantly larger for female funds than for male funds (n = 780, female mean =
7.07, male mean = 5.27, p = 2.28e-06). This potentially indicates that females are not given
enough capital because their net alphas are so high. Additionally, female funds showed
statistically significantly higher value added as compared to male funds (n = 780, female mean =
209,697,048,979, male mean = 44,004,869,481, p = 2.2e-16). This higher value added shows that
females are likely more skilled than males since they are able to extract higher value added even
while not receiving enough investment capital.

Together, these two statistically significant results indicate that females are not given enough
capital but can still extract higher value added, showing higher skill. Thus, it is possible that the
reason that females are not receiving enough investment capital from investors is that investors
might be discriminating against females based on gender, even when these female fund managers
might be more skilled and extracting more value added than male fund managers. It is likely that
gender is impacting investors’ capital allocation decisions.
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CHALLENGES AND COVEATS

While this study found statistically significant results, it is vital to wary of these conclusions and
to not generalize these results fully to the overarching concept of gender.

Small Percentage of Females
First, only 10% of mutual fund managers are women in the United States (Chadick 2009). As a
result, finding a sufficient sample that included a sufficient number of female funds within the
proper timeframe proved challenging, especially since many of these women manage funds with
a team of men. It is unclear if females are extracting higher value added or if it is the
combination of males and females. This study did not include any female-only funds, and the
only parameter to labeling a fund as female was that the fund’s management team was composed
of at least 10% females. Perhaps when men and women manage a fund together, those funds
should not be labeled as female since discrimination might not be as much of a factor when men
are also present as the face of the fund. Additionally, perhaps it is diversity, not strictly gender,
that leads to high value added and thus high skill.

Self-Selection Bias in the Females who Manage Funds
The results of this study show that females have higher skill than males, but this should not be
generalized as a gender outcome—the takeaway might be that the women in the sample happen
to be more skilled than the men in the sample. The takeaway cannot be that females, as a gender,
are better at investing. There is a huge selection bias in the females that manage mutual funds—
very few females choose to work in finance and very few choose to stay within finance and make
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it to high management levels. Given the industry, females are much more filtered than males, as
it is likely that only the highest skilled of all females are mutual fund managers because there are
so few of them.

Small Sample Size Compared to the Universe of US Mutual Funds
This research focused on past mutual fund data and employed statistical methods, so sampling
was done by choosing data from databases. Various databases could have been chosen, but given
the resources available, Morningstar was viewed as the best option. Unfortunately, Morningstar
only allowed for 5,000 funds to be downloaded and analyzed, even though the actual universe of
US mutual funds is at least five times larger. Perhaps if data could have been obtained for all US
mutual funds, the results would have been more comprehensive.

With that small number, the data was further narrowed because not all 5,000 funds could be
used—4,220 funds were excluded because Morningstar did not include all the return between
2006 and 2016 for those funds. After excluding so many funds from the sample, there were less
data points (only 780). Results were significant with 780 data points, but the results cannot be
fully compelling because they do not fairly represent the true, large number of US mutual funds.

SIGNIFICANCE

Understanding these effects could have significant implications for mutual funds, as investors
decide which managers to invest with and as management teams for funds are created. If such
research increases investment into female funds along with increasing gender diversity in funds,
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it is possible that certain funds will be able to start extracting more value added with more
capital, which could have positive effects on the global economy and financial system.

From a more macro-lens, a significant increase in investment dollars given to female managers
and an uptick in gender diversity among mutual fund management teams in the United States
could be a crucial step in moving toward gender parity in the finance industry. While the world is
still approximately another 80 years away from women achieving economic parity with men,
such an increase in parity within a specific industry would bring us one step closer (World
Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2014).

FUTURE RESEARCH

Future research could be done to more comprehensively and reliable find the answer to whether
gender is related to investors’ capital allocation decisions. First, in the future, more mutual funds
could be analyzed. A sample size of closer to 20,000 funds would be more accurate. Such a
larger sample size could (1) allow for the collapsing of sub-funds under the firm level, to better
reflect the structure of mutual funds and (2) include more females so that the definition of a
female fund and a male fund could be clearer (and perhaps even a mix-gender fund category
could be added). Additionally, in the future, interviews could prove interesting to provide a more
holistic perspective on this research question. Interviews could be conducted, employing a semistructured method of interviewing, to question how industry professionals view and experience
gender differences when managing mutual funds.
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